
[This post is authored by Pranjali Bhatt. Pranjali is a third-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law University Delhi, with a keen interest in trademark and copyright law.]
Can a court still grant interim relief after holding that the petitioner suppressed relevant and material facts? The Delhi High Court(DHC) recently responded to this question in Mandeep Singh v. Shabir Momin & Ors, by granting the petitioner, Mandeep Singh, founder of ‘INSTANT BOLLYWOOD’, interim relief despite finding suppression, after imposing costs of twenty lakh rupees. The Court found non-disclosure of material documents showing Mandeep Singh’s prior knowledge of registrations and held that this non- disclosure amounted to suppression. We have previously seen that courts either deny interim injunctions solely on grounds of suppression of material facts (DCM Shriram v. Amreek Singh, discussed here), or have allowed the application on the grounds of public interest after imposing costs on the petitioner (Sun Pharma v. DWD Pharma, discussed here). However, in this case, the DHC has allowed the application because Mandeep Singh’s 50% IP rights in the brand were acknowledged. In this post, I examine the Court’s reasoning and its approach to the ‘clean hands doctrine’.
Background
The Petitioner, Mandeep Singh, is the owner of the brand ‘INSTANT BOLLYWOOD’, a well-known entertainment and digital media brand that provides information relating to the Indian film industry. Since 2012, Mandeep Singh provided the services under the name and style of ‘INSTA BOLLYWOOD’, later changed to ‘INSTANT BOLLYWOOD’. While the brand name was continuously used as a trade name from 2012 onwards, a device mark has been used in relation to the brand since 2016.
In 2019, he entered into an agreement with One Digital Entertainment Pte. Ltd. [‘ODE’] for the management and development of the said brand. The Agreement recognised joint ownership of rights in a 50: 50 ratio. According to Mandeep Singh, despite the Agreement, Shabir Momin, managing director of ODE, had applied and obtained registrations for the ‘INSTANT BOLLYWOOD’ above device mark across multiple classes exclusively in his name. These registrations are challenged in the present petitions.
These registrations were later assigned to Times Internet Inc., allegedly without Mandeep Singh’s consent, who asserted that he had no notice of these registrations prior to August 2025. Aggrieved by this, Mandeep Singh approached the DHC and sought cancellation and rectification of the registrations along with interim injunctions restraining further assignment or creation of third- party rights.
Clean Hands Doctrine & Injunctive Relief
Times Internet Inc. pointed out that while Mandeep Singh argued that he became aware of the trademark registrations only in August 2025, documents placed on record, including legal notices and the 2019 Agreement, suggested that he was aware of these registrations as early as 2022. It was argued that these documents were not disclosed by him when he approached the Court, and this amounts to suppression of material facts. This argument is in line with the ‘clean hands’ doctrine.
According to this doctrine, any person who is approaching the court for a remedy must come with clean hands, i.e., the person should put forward the circumstances with truthfulness and should not jeopardize the position of the Respondent by fabricating facts or wilfully suppressing material facts, as has been previously discussed here.
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1993), the Supreme Court observed “a litigant who approaches the Court must come with clean hands”, and any suppression of material facts justifies dismissal of the claim. Similarly, the DHC in Seemax Construction (P) Ltd. v. State Bank of India (1991) had previously held that “The suppression of material fact by itself is a sufficient ground to decline the discretionary relief of injunction. A party seeking discretionary relief has to approach the court with clean hands and is required to disclose all material facts which may, one way or the other, affect the decision.”
More recently, in Freebit AS v Exotic Mile Private Limited (2024), it was emphasised that ex parte injunctions should not be granted when plaintiffs fail to disclose material facts. In Forzest v Folzest (2022), the Court even imposed costs of ten lakh rupees on the plaintiff seeking an injunction without full disclosure, as has been laid down in Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors v. Nirmala Devi & Ors. (2011) Thus, whenever a petitioner seeks an injunction, there is an obligation to disclose all relevant material facts to the court, even if not favourable to his own case.
Suppression of Material Facts
In its analysis, the Court agreed with Times Internet Inc and found that non-disclosure of relevant and material documents amounts to suppression. This finding alone would have been sufficient to reject the injunctive relief, yet the Court did not take that route. Despite the suppression of material documents, the Court acknowledged Mandeep Singh’s 50% Intellectual Property Rights in the brand ‘INSTANT BOLLYWOOD’ and the device mark by relying upon the 2019 Agreement and the exchanged legal notices between the parties.
In my view, the non-disclosure was material because the documents showed that Mandeep Singh had knowledge of these registrations as early as 2022. Prior knowledge affects delay, urgency, and equity, and the courts have consistently treated such facts as material and denied injunctive relief. However, although the suppression was material, Mandeep Singh’s 50% IP rights in the brand remained unaffected by such non-disclosure.
Unlike the outcome in the recent Quantum Hi- Tech Merchandising Pvt Ltd v LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, discussed by Md. Thahir Sulaiman, the Court adopted a balanced approach and granted interim injunctive relief, but at the same time, imposed costs of twenty lakhs rupees on Mandeep Singh as a penalty for approaching the Court with unclean hands. Thus, the Court clarified that the ‘clean hands’ doctrine does not have an overriding effect when injunctive relief can be granted on the merits. The Court held that Mandeep Singh had suppressed material documents. However, it did not deal with the effect this non-disclosure had on the grant of interim relief. This raises a question of whether disclosure of Mandeep Singh’s prior knowledge of the registrations would have had any bearing on the Court’s decision to entertain the interim application. The finding of suppression ultimately resulted only in the imposition of costs.
Why Does This Matter?
The ruling is noteworthy since the Court had all the reasons to reject the interim injunction as per S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath case, but instead it passed an interim injunction, along with costs of twenty lakh rupees for approaching it with unclean hands. Should the plaintiff have been penalized for its conduct? Yes, like in the Forzest v. Folzest case, the petitioner here faced financial consequences for its suppression. It is a reminder that equity requires transparency and further helps in preventing the misuse of legal processes by imposing monetary penalties. Whether this approach will discourage suppression of material facts or simply convert non-disclosure into a risk that can be financially absorbed remains to be seen.
