The Delhi High Court’s decision to appoint an amicus curiae to represent Vivek Oberoi’s perspective after his counsel withdrew raises an unusual procedural question in a civil suit pertaining to the right of publicity. This tidbit by Vishwas Kumar Tripathi examines whether such an appointment fits within the established role of an amicus curiae, or risks creating a safety net for plaintiffs who stop actively participating in their own cases. Vishwas is a 4th law student pursuing his B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, with a special focus on Intellectual Property Law, Public Policy, and Technology law.
SpicyIP Tidbit – Court’s Friend or Counsel for the Absent Party: Analyzing Delhi Court’s Appointment of Amicus for Vivek Oberoi
By Vishwas Kumar Tripathi
In an interesting turn of events, the Delhi High Court has taken an unconventional route in the Vivek Oberoi personality rights case by appointing an amicus curiae to represent the actor. Earlier, X, one of the defendants in Oberoi’s personality rights suit, filed an application stating that some of the posts in question did not infringe his personality rights and instead fell under the bracket of free speech by a user of the platform. Oberoi did not respond to the application, and later his counsel asked to be removed from the matter as he was not receiving instructions from the actor. The post looks at the unconventional approach of the Court and assesses whether this approach is in line with the existing precedents on amicus appointments.
But first, a bit of background. In February 2026, Oberoi approached the Delhi High Court seeking an ex-parte ad-interim order to protect his personality rights and restrain multiple entities from misusing his name, image, voice, and likeness through AI tools. He argued that he had a career spanning over more than two decades and has acquired immense goodwill and reputation as a successful actor, businessman, and a philanthropist in the industry, and such image is associated with him in the minds of the public. He further stated that his personality rights are legally protected and any unauthorized commercial/non-commercial exploitation of his “persona” would invite violation of his rights u/A 21 of the Indian Constitution.
The Court assessed and granted the injunction, holding “that attributes such as Plaintiff’s name, image, likeness, and voice were distinctively associated with him and are capable of protection as facets of personality rights.”
Deciding the Amicus Question:
As noted above, since Oberoi’s counsel sought to be removed from the case, the Court appointed Adv. Rohan J. Alva as an amicus curiae to “represent and ensure that Plaintiff’s perspective does not go unrepresented in the Court”.
On a plain reading of the order, such appointment can be inferred to create a legal bridge between the plaintiff and the Court in this active litigation. However, appointing an amicus curiae in such disputes is an unconventional route and shows a clear departure from the standard practice undertaken across civil, criminal and intellectual property disputes.
As a general rule, when a plaintiff fails to appear or abandons civil proceedings, courts usually follow two standard statutory routes: First, under Order IX Rule 8 of CPC, if the defendant appears in the Court when a suit is called for hearing, but the plaintiff is absent, then the Court can dismiss the suit. This stance has also been reinforced by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Sharada Sanghi & Ors. V. Asha Agarwal, wherein if the plaintiff initiates civil proceedings and later abandons the suit is dismissed for default. Second, under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC, it states that any party affected by an interim injunction can apply to have it discharged, subject to the Court’s satisfaction that the order has caused an undue hardship to the affected party. However, leaving this standard operating procedure, the Court instead appointed an amicus in the present case.
Furthermore, to understand this departure more closely, we must also analyze the purpose of appointing an “amicus curiae”. In the case of Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019), the Supreme Court stated that an appointment of an Amicus Curiae serves a dual purpose, Firstly, to assist the Court by providing independent expertise, research and perspective on complex and important question of law without bias, and Secondly, to prevent miscarriage of justice by ensuring that a party does not go unrepresented in a Court of law, by fulfilling conditions of a fair trial under Article 21 and 39A. Additionally, the Court also set out criteria for the appointment of Amicus Curiae in matters involving potential life imprisonment or the death penalty, consideration of senior advocates for death sentence confirmation appeals in High Courts, mandating a reasonable preparation window for appointed counsel, and ensuring that counsel is given adequate opportunity to conduct meetings and consultations with the accused.
It is also pertinent to note that the concept of appointing an advocate for an unrepresented party as an amicus curiae in a case largely stems from criminal matters, and the aforementioned criteria also substantiates the same stance. However, the appointment of an Amicus Curiae or third-party advisor in civil matters is governed by the Court’s inherent powers under Section 151 of CPC, 1908 to make orders that are necessary to provide complete justice to the parties in the case.
In the present case, the Amicus Curiae was appointed as a consequence of the formal discharge of Oberoi’s counsel on the grounds of lack of communication and not to enlighten the Court on a substantial question of law, as an ex-parte injunction was already secured earlier. Furthermore, the Court itself states under Para 16.2 that the Amicus was appointed “in order to ensure that the plaintiff’s perspective does not go unrepresented” and such appointment is substantially made in order to represent the private commercial interest of the party and in no way intersects with or helps in providing “complete justice” to the parties involved in the case.
Thus, applying such a notion in a civil suit involving protection of personality rights of “a successful actor, businessman, and a philanthropist” can bring a procedural shift and can set an unchecked precedent for the near future for others to misuse. This approach already bypasses the statutory civil remedies and raises a serious question of whether, by instituting such precedent, the judiciary is prepared to provide such a safety net across all commercial matters where a plaintiff secures an ex-parte injunction and subsequently abandons active prosecution. Under this approach, defendants like Collective Bazae and other online platforms in the case are forced to spend time and money against a “Court-appointed advocate” meant for representing the Plaintiff, while the real plaintiff avoids all accountability and thus creates an unfair advantage for the Plaintiff.
Conclusion
In this particular case, while the Court’s intent may have been to appoint an objective legal officer to review the record and provide expertise to the Court, such action can have a domino effect on how such cases are treated in the future. This may lead future litigants to adopt a “Gain-an-injunction-and-Ghost Strategy”, wherein every time a plaintiff secures an interim injunction order in his/her favor, he can effectively cease participation, shifting the burden from the private party to the Court to defend the “plaintiff’s perspective”. In this way, the plaintiff enjoys the full benefit of an ongoing injunction without responding either to the Court or the defendants. Furthermore, such orders in personality rights cases often use broad language to widen their ambit and may also lead to the suppression of news reports, corporate criticisms, or opinions on the internet, as has been pointed out here.
Thus, appointing an amicus curiae to bridge the gap left by a defaulting and financially capable civil plaintiff is a procedural anomaly, and courts should be cautious to undertake such an action. This mechanism belongs as a tool under Article 21 to resolve complex legal questions and not for the preservation of private civil suits. Finally, protecting personality rights in the digital age requires robust remedies, but those remedies must not operate without a willing and participative litigant in the process and certainly not at the Court’s expense and time.
