A CSK superfan who paints himself yellow and writes Dhoni’s (nick)name and number on his body has won an interim injunction against Blinkit in the Madras High Court. In Part I of this two-part post, Dr. Aakanksha Kumar looks at what the order gets right, where it once again blurs the right of publicity with passing off, and why it should not matter whether Saravanan Hari is a “celebrity”. Aakanksha is an independent researcher and academic. Since 2019, she has designed and taught a self-created elective course across law schools titled Comparative Celebrity Laws: Personality, Publicity and Free Speech.

[Part I] Whistle, Podu? – A Simple Case, a Hard Question, and a Wild Claim
Dr. Aakanksha Kumar
On 16 November 2026, the Madras High Court granted an interim injunction in favour of Saravanan Hari (‘Hari’), a Chennai Super Kings (‘CSK’) superfan, against Blink Commerce Private Limited (the company behind Blinkit – Indian quick-commerce platform), over an advertisement on the front page of the Sunday Times on 23 March 2025. On 17 November 2026, the man whose name and number that superfan paints on his body called time on his IPL playing career. CSK confirmed that Dhoni stays on as team mentor, and that “Thala will always be a part of our identity.” A bittersweet week, then, to be Hari: a win in court one day, his Thala’s last bow as an IPL player the next.
Of all the personality rights orders I have read this year (and there have been many), this is the one I did not see coming. The Court records that “admittedly, the plaintiff is not a celebrity like Amitab [sic] Bachchan, Rajinikanth or sportspersons like Sachin Tendulkar or M.S.Dhoni. He is only a fan” (para 2). The fan in question follows CSK across India and abroad, paints himself yellow, and writes Dhoni’s name and his No. 7 jersey number on his body. Newspapers and match broadcasts have carried that image for years.
His case was that Blinkit’s advertisement copied that image and his signature pose, without consent; that people who knew him called to ask whether he was endorsing the product; and that the advertisement was still available in the online edition. Blinkit’s reply to the notice said the characters were “entirely distinct and fictional”. The newspaper further said it had only published what it was given. Justice P.B. Balaji was not persuaded by Blinkit, finding a “clear resemblance” to the plaintiff and to “the same pose” reproduced in newspapers, a likelihood that the public would be misled into thinking the plaintiff was part of the advertisement, and an admittedly commercial use. Without consent, the Court held, Blinkit could not exploit the “individual personality rights that have been acquired, whatever little it may be, for commercial gain” (para 9). The Court then granted an interim injunction against Blinkit alone and directed it to preserve the artwork and design materials. The newspaper’s liability, and the application for accounts, were left for trial and for a hearing after appearance. The matter is next listed on 14 December 2026.
Arguably the Right Result, but Continued Muddling of “Rights”
On these facts, the order is commendably restrained in reach.
- It is an advertisement. A front-page Sunday advertisement is the textbook case: an identifiable persona used to sell something else. This is exactly where the right of publicity is at its strongest, being prima facie available when the plaintiff is clearly identifiable from the defendant’s unauthorised advertising use.
- There is evidence of confusion. Submissions made suggested that acquaintances asked the plaintiff whether he was endorsing the product (para 4). In an area where interim relief is routinely granted on the plaintiff’s fame alone, an order that records actual misrepresentation [associative confusion] is quite welcome.
- It does not go John Doe Defendants. The injunction runs against Blinkit only. The newspaper’s liability is left to trial, the accounts application waits for a counter, and the only other direction preserves the evidence.
- It does not make fame a condition. “Whatever little it may be” is, I think, doctrinally still muddled though: fame goes to the quantum of commercial value, not to whether the right exists. It is a welcome counterpoint to the Delhi High Court’s April 2026 view in Toprankers that a single achievement (there, a CLAT All India Rank 1) does not confer personality rights.
h:Para 9, however, runs together elements of two different wrongs:
- Identity Indicia: the court finds that the ad shows someone who looks like the plaintiff, in his familiar pose. This is identifiability, from the plaintiff’s indicia of identity, an element of the right of publicity – misappropriation tort.
- Likelihood of misleading the public: (because of the resemblance), people may think he appeared in the ad. This is an element of the passing off – misrepresentation tort.
- Commercial use without consent: his persona is exploited for a clear advertising use, i.e. there is commercial benefit to the defendant. This is associative misappropriation, the core of the right of publicity.
The order doesn’t say which wrong it is enforcing.
This is the same blurring of passing off and the right of publicity I flagged in the Allu Arjun order (discussed here), and the reason I keep describing personality rights as “a salad platter of analytically distinct claims”. Para 3 adds that the Constitution protects every individual, without saying which right is guaranteed, and against whom, further muddling the nature and source of the right(s) being asserted – which are that of the commercial, non dignitary interests in persona. What it did need, even at the prima facie stage, were two questions:
- which right(s)? “Personality rights”, is “not a single cause of action” but “a description of several distinct claims”, and “[e]ach claim carries its own elements, defences and remedy” [As observed by Justice Kaurav, in Kriti Sanon, discussed here].
- what are their elements, and is each prima facie made out?
What is concerning though, is that the record answers both questions; the order just never puts them in order. For the right of publicity, the elements are identity indicia with a valid “holder”, an unauthorised commercial use, identifiability from that use, and commercial benefit to the defendant (Titan). A front-page advertisement, a “clear resemblance” and “the same pose” (para 9), and no consent: every element is there. For passing off, the elements are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage (Refer D.M. Entertainment at para 16). Years of press coverage (para 3), and acquaintances asking whether he had endorsed the product (para 4), go straight to goodwill and misrepresentation. Two causes of action, each prima facie made out on its own elements, would’ve been the ideal for this fact scenario. Instead, para 9 collapses them into one “personality right”.
“Admittedly … not a celebrity”? He Is, and It Should Not Matter Anyway
The order records that, “admittedly, the plaintiff is not a celebrity like” Amitabh Bachchan, Rajinikanth, Sachin Tendulkar or M.S. Dhoni (para 2). Not a celebrity like them, certainly. But not a celebrity at all? On the definitions I worked with in my thesis, Hari is one. He is Chris Rojek’s (paywalled) attributed celebrity, made visible by the “newspaper articles and interviews, wherein specific and special reference has been made” to him (para 3). Robert van Krieken (paywalled) defines celebrity as “a quality or status characterised by a capacity to attract attention, generating some ‘surplus value’ or benefit derived from the fact of being well known (highly visible) in itself in at least one public arena”. For Hari, that arena is the stadium. The surplus value is what his visibility there generates, and the Blinkit ad takes it for itself. Hari also sits within David Tan’s (paywalled) “celebrity trinity” – the economically valuable public persona is the “collective product of the celebrity individual, the audience, and the cultural producers”. All three are present here: the individual: Mr. Hari, painting himself yellow and following the team across India and abroad; the audience: the crowds who recognise him, and the acquaintances who saw the advertisement and asked whether he was endorsing the product; the cultural producers: the newspapers and broadcasters who made him visible, and, finally, the advertiser that turned that visibility into a selling message.
He is S.V. Srinivas’s fan at “the point of convergence between the audience on the one hand and the film (here, sports) star on the other”, who then crossed it. Even Titan counts as a celebrity “a person who ‘many’ people talk about or know about” (para 15), as does D.M. Entertainment, quoting Star India v. Leo Burnett for “characters”(para 12).
But it should not matter. Fame is not an element of the right of publicity. D.M. Entertainment protects against the “unauthorized appropriation of an individual very persona” (para 13). As the court pointed out in Kriti Sanon, “fame bears on whether an identity has commercial value and on the loss caused by its misuse; it is not a condition of the right” (para 22). Such rights are “available to one and all, and not only to celebrities” (para 16, drawing on Krishna Kishore Singh). And since “celebrification is predicated on the fandom quite necessarily” (As I argue here), for Hari, the economic associative value of his “superfan” persona is the result of him using the attributes (and welcoming generosity) of the CSK franchise and the captain.
[The order reaches a defensible result, but it never asks which right it is enforcing or whether that right’s elements are made out. In Part II, I turn to the wilder question the case raises: what happens when the persona being protected is a fan’s figure built from a franchise’s colours and a captain’s number, and used in a match-day advertisement with a coupon attached. ]
